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The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) presently under construction at CERN, will contain about 100 tons of
helium mostly located in equipment in the underground tunnel and in caverns. Potential failure modes of the
accelerator, which may be followed by helium discharge to the tunnel, have been identified and the
corresponding helium flows calculated [1, 2, 3]. In case of helium discharge in the tunnel causing oxygen
deficiency, personnel working in the tunnel shall be warned and evacuate safely. This paper describes
oxygen deficiency monitoring system based on the parameter of limited visibility due to the LHC tunnel
curvature and acceptable delay time between the failure and the system activation.
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The philosophy of the proposed oxygen deficiency monitoring system is to warn 
personnel present in the tunnel in case of a helium discharge causing oxygen deficiency. It 
must be a “fool-proof” system indicating in an easy, comprehensive way all actions to be 
taken to escape safely from the LHC tunnel sector concerned. 
Persons may not enter the underground without being equipped with personal survival 
kits containing self-rescue supplied atmosphere oxygen masks. They shall be warned (alarm 
level 3) [4] sufficiently in advance to protect themselves by help of atmosphere respirators 
[5].  
Personnel shall have sufficient education and training. Furthermore, when working in 
the LHC underground, people shall never work alone [6]. 
2. Definitions and assumptions 
2.1. Assumptions 
For this study, the following assumptions have been taken into consideration: 
1. Some of the analysed failure modes of the LHC cryogenic system can be followed by 
a helium discharge into the tunnel and consequently an oxygen deficiency could occur 
[1]. According to the TIS Safety Instruction [8], a minimal allowable percentage of 
oxygen in the atmosphere is 19%. 
2. Important cold helium release will cause visible humidity condensation in the vicinity 
of the relief point.  
3. Helium release in large quantities will generate noise. 
4. The concept of the ventilation system for underground tunnels has been specified 
according to reference 7. 
5. The discharged helium will propagate together with the ventilation airflow along the 
tunnel. The tunnel slope does not enable helium-enriched mixtures to flow against the 
ventilation air. 
6. The air-helium mixture propagation velocity will be similar to that of the ventilation 
air. Due to the increase in the total volumetric flow in the tunnel after the warm-up of 
the discharged helium, an average air-helium propagation velocity may exceed the 
initial ventilation velocity by a factor of about two. 
7. An oxygen deficiency will be detected by the system as soon as the oxygen deficient 
atmosphere reaches the closest ODH monitor. 
8. Persons present in the tunnel could be warned either by an alarm signal activated by an 
ODH monitor, a visible cloud of moisture, noise of exhausting helium or by other 
persons leaving the discharge zone. 
9. Each ODH monitor must trigger alarm indicators (e.g. flashing lights or signals) and 
must also inform the safety control room (e.g. fire brigade) which has to take actions 
adequate to a level 3 alarm.  
2.2. Access to the tunnel 
As a general rule only people authorised may have access to the tunnel. 
The LHC areas from the surface site to the tunnel have been classified [8] in the 
following way:  
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1. Access sites and surface buildings (e.g. SD, SZ, SX): no radiation risk is present in 
these zones. 
2. Underground zones accessible when beam on (e.g. some PM, PX, PZ sha fts, some US 
caverns, part of UX halls): low residual radiation and people holding a film badge 
have access to them during LHC operation.  
3. Underground zones not accessible when beam on (e.g. some PM, PX, PZ shafts, the 
klystrons galleries UA, the technical service zones US, UW and UL, part of the UX 
halls, portions of the UJ tunnels): no access is allowed during LHC operation. 
4. Experimental caverns and tunnel (e.g. main ring, part of the UX halls, injection tunnel 
TI1 and TI8): the beam is circulating in these zones and no access is allowed during 
LHC operation. 
For each zone a dedicated type of control system is associated. Depending on the zones, 
a CERN card, a film badge, the access key or a dosimeter may be required. For example, to 
enter the LHC sites and the surface building the CERN card with the ID number is required, 
while to enter the underground tunnel and caverns, a film badge and access key are needed in 
addition. Details are given in reference [9]. 
2.3. Warning signals 
Personnel in the tunnel can be notified about ODH by the following signals: 
- signals generated by activated ODH monitors located in the tunnel, 
- signals generated by activated personal ODH monitors, 
- visible mist caused by condensed humidity in the vicinity of a helium relief point,  
- noise generated by an important amount of helium vented to the tunnel. 
2.4. Signals indicating the direction of escape 
The system must provide clear and simple indications to assure safe escape of personnel 
in the right direction.  
Persons present within the visibility distance from the helium discharge shall always 
evacuate away from the discharge point.  
Persons warned by the activated oxygen deficiency system shall evacuate in the 
direction of the nearest exit. If the helium discharge point is between them and the exit, they 
shall change the escape direction as soon as they notice the point of incident (e.g. cloud, 
noise).  
3. Concept of the LHC ventilation system 
The ventilation concept for the LHC is based on a nominal air velocity of 0.55 m/s 
(nominal volumetric-flow of 6.25 m3/s) and an emergency air velocity of 0.88 m/s 
(emergency volumetric- flow of 10 m3/s). The air is supplied at the even points 2, 4, 6, 8 by 
ventilators located at surface and extracted at the odd points 1, 3, 5, 7. The operational 
principle of the ventilation system is shown in Figure 1.  
Details concerning the conditioning of the supplied air are given under reference 10. 
The elevation of the LHC tunnel and the direction of the ventilation air for the different 
sectors are shown in Figure 2. Calculations of relative air/helium velocity have confirmed that 
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Figure 2: Tunnel elevation and ventilation air direction 
4. Helium discharge and propagation in the LHC accelerator 
tunnel under worst case scenario cryogenic failure conditions 
Three failure modes of the LHC cryogenic system leading to the worst case scenario 
with respect to the helium discharge into the tunnel have been identified [1]. They are listed in 
Table 1, where the corresponding helium mass flow (qm_He), the initial helium temperature 
(THe) [2], the minimum and maximum oxygen concentration in the stratified helium-enriched 
layer (O2,min and O2,max) [3] are also given.  
The minimum oxygen concentration (O2,min) corresponds to the helium-air mixture with 
the same density as air (see also Figure 3a). The maximum oxygen concentration (O2,max) 
corresponds to the helium-air mixture with the minimum density (see also Figure 3a). The 
columns qmcr_mix for nominal (w = 0.55 m/s) and emergency (w = 0.88 m/s) air flow give the 
minimum mass flows of the helium-air mixture that ensure a stratification of oxygen 
concentration in the LHC tunnel [3].  
As the estimated helium mass discharge qm_He is higher by at least an order of 
magnitude, the stratified flow of helium-air mixture along the LHC tunnel is to be taken into 
account in any case of an important helium relief to the tunnel. 
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average* 1 10 6.5 11.5 0.0145 0.0597 1 Break of header C peak 3 25 2.8 8.0 0.0074 0.0307 




connection peak 20 4 7.7 12.5 0.0196 0.0805 
average* 1 290 --- 13** 0.0723 0.2965 
3 Break of ring line peak 14 290 --- 13** 0.0723 0.2965 
 * average mass-flow rate over 15 min following the peak, ** obtained experimentally  
 
The oxygen concentrations and the corresponding mixture temperature in the stratified 
layer are calculated with respect to the buoyancy condition (see Figure 3). If the discharge 
helium temperature is lower than 50 K (failures 1 and 2), air must be added to reach air 
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a) oxygen concentration b) mixture temperature 
Figure 3. Properties of helium-air mixture versus initial helium temperature 
 
As a result of an extensive mass and heat exchange with atmosphere in the lower part of 
the tunnel, the temperature of the stratified layer will be high enough to avoid air 
condensation. The temperature in the lower part of the tunnel will remain relatively high, not 
creating a hazard of tissue freezing (refer to Figure 6).  
If the helium is discharged at ambient temperature (failure 3), the mixing with air is the 
result of a turbulent jet only and the oxygen concentration corresponding to the helium-air 
mixture with the minimum density has been determined experimentally (see Table 1) [3]. 
4.1. Experimental study of helium dispersion in air 
A dedicated test set-up representing a section of the LHC tunnel at a scale 1:13 has been 
built and different scenarios of the LHC cryogenic system failures have been experimentally 
simulated. The hydrodynamic scaling from the test set-up to the full-scale tunnel is described 
in [3]. The flow pattern to be expected in case of an important cold helium discharge (failures 
1 and 2) to the LHC tunnel is shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 gives the oxygen concentration to 
be expected in case of warm helium discharge. In this case there is no mist, but oxygen 
stratification is still observed. Stratification of an oxygen-deficient layer in the upper part of 















a) test boundary conditions and measured oxygen concentration b) flow visualisation 












Figure 5. Schematic representation of warm helium discharge to the test tunnel 
 
The temperature distribution across the test tunnel during an important cold helium 
release is shown in Figure 6. A temperature of about 200 K was observed at 0.18 m tunnel 
height when helium was discharged to the tunnel without any forced airflow (Figure 6a). The 
temperature increases rapidly towards the lower part of the tunnel. Higher temperatures were 
observed in the flowing mixture with initial air velocity of 0.24 m/s (Figure 6b). In both cases 
the temperatures were higher than those calculated (Figure 3b). The temperature profile does 
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b) forced air flow  
Figure 6. Temperature distribution across the test tunnel 
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4.2. Humidity condensation and its visibility 
Figure 7 shows the calculated variation of the average temperature in the tunnel cross 
section where the helium discharge occurs as a function of the discharge mass flow rate. Two 
cases of initial helium temperature (failure 1 and 2) have been considered with respect to the 
nominal and emergency air ventilation flow. The mixture temperature significantly drops 
below the dew point even for helium flows as low as 0.2 kg/s, what means that condensed 
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Figure 7. Helium-air mixture temperature versus helium discharge mass flow rate 
 
Taking into account the heat exchange process between the gas mixture and the tunnel 
wall as well as the machine equipment, the mixture temperature will remain lower than the 
dew point temperature over a distance of at least 20 m.  
In case of failure, the helium discharge point will be visible to persons present in the 
LHC tunnel but the visibility distance will be limited by the tunnel curvature as shown in 
Figure 8. In this analysis the distance is 284 m. 
Taking into account a nominal velocity of 0.55 m/s, maximum delay time between the 
first visual observation of a discharge and the time the helium-air front reaches the observer is 
516 s.  
5. ODH monitor distribution in the LHC tunnel 
The ODH monitors must be distributed in such a way as to ensure efficient warning of 
all persons in the tunnel sector concerned during a possible helium discharge. According to 
the position of persons in the tunnel, two cases must be analysed as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. ODH evacuation conditions for personnel 
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Case 1: tunnel section between the discharge point and the adjacent ODH sensor 
following the ventilation direction. 
The persons to be warned and evacuated are located between the discharge point and the 
ODH sensor that will be activated first (sensor 1 in Figure 9), and will thus not be warned by 
the lattice ODH sensors before they may find themselves in an oxygen deficient atmosphere. 
The way to be informed about the event is to hear the noise from the exhausting helium or to 
notice the formation of mist in case of cold helium discharge. To warn the persons in case 
they cannot see the mist formation, the distance between two adjacent ODH sensors should 
not exceed the visibility distance in the LHC tunnel, namely 284 m (see Figure 9). 
 
Case 2: rest of the tunnel. 
The persons located within the visibility distance from the discharge point should 
evacuate away from it as soon as they notice the event. The persons located outside the 
visibility distance from the discharge point will be warned by the activated ODH system and 
should start walking towards the nearest exit from the tunnel. In case they approach the 
discharge point they should change direction.  
 
The ODH monitors should be located (see Figure 10): 
- at the upper parts of the tunnel enlargements and junctions, 
- in the alcoves, 
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Figure. 10. Location of the ODH monitors in the LHC tunnel 
 
Table 2 summarises the inventory of the ODH monitors in the tunnel. The LHC sectors 
are named according to the LHC sectorization as shown in the Appendix A. The detailed 
inventory of the sensors is also given in the Appendix A.  
 
Table 2. Number of ODH sensors in the LHC tunnel  
Sectors Enlargements  
and junctions [11] 
Alcoves Regular tunnel Total 
2-1 8 2 8 18 
2-3 5 2 7 14 
4-3 7 2 11 20 
4-5 5 2 9 16 
6-5 11 2 9 22 
6-7 5 2 9 16 
8-7 8 2 9 19 
8-1 8 2 8 18 
Total 57 16 70 143 
 9 
6. Training  
As the access to the LHC zones, experimental caverns and the tunnel will be extensively 
controlled (compare point 2.2), only well- trained personnel should be allowed to access 
underground areas. Dedicated safety training shall be implemented for personnel to work in 
the tunnel. These courses shall have the aim: 
- to give information on the underground areas and type of cryogenic system failure 
related hazards (asphyxiation, tissue freezing),   
- to explain the procedures to be applied in case of helium discharge to the tunnel,  
- to define the conditions under which individual protection equipment must be used, 
- to train how to use the individual protecting equipment.  
The instructions to be followed shall always be clear, simple and easy to apply. Personnel 
must be trained such that they always move away from the discharge point.  
7. Conclusions 
The personnel should be trained before being given access to underground areas. 
Important helium venting to the tunnel causing an oxygen deficiency hazard will 
generate noise and in case of cold helium release it will be followed by a visible humidity 
condensation in the vicinity of the discharge point. 
Persons present between the discharge point and the first ODH sensor to be activated 
will hear the noise of exhausting helium and may see the cloud caused by humidity 
condensation. 
The visibility distance of 284 m in the LHC tunnel should be the parameter, which 
limits the maximum distance between two adjacent ODH sensors.  
When hearing the noise of exhausting helium, persons must always move away from the 
discharge point. Persons being outside the visibility distance from the relief point will be 
warned as soon as the oxygen deficient cloud reaches the closest ODH monitor. They shall 
move towards the closest exit. In case they approach the discharge point they should change 
direction. The longest distance one may have to walk is the length of one and a half sector. 
Due to the stratification of the oxygen deficient layer at the upper part of the tunnel, 
ODH sensors should be located at the top in the regular part of the tunnel, in the 
enlargements, in the junctions and in the alcoves. 
Table 3 summarises the number of ODH sensors in the different locations and gives the 
main parameters linked to the location of the ODH sensors.  
 
Table 3.  Location of ODH sensors 






Enlargements/jonctions  57 Yes/No  Yes 
Alcoves 12 No No 
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Table 1. Sector 2–1 
Location  Number 
Enlargements/junctions PM25 (top of pit) 1 
 UJ24 1 
 UJ23 1 
 PM18 1 
 RR17 1 
 UJ16 1 
 PM12 (top of pit) 1 
 TI2  1 
Alcoves  2 
Regular tunnel  from UJ23 to PM18 8 
 Total 18 
 
 
Table 2. Sector 2–3 
Location  Number 
Enlargements/junctions UJ26 1 
 UJ27 1 
 UJ32 1 
 UJ33 1 
 PM32 (top of pit) 1 
Alcoves  2 
Regular tunnel  from UJ27 to UJ32 7 
 Total 14 
 
 
Table 3. Sector 4–3 
Location  Number 
Enlargements/junctions PM45 (top of pit) 1 
 PZ45 (top of pit) 1 
 UX45 1 
 UJ44 1 
 UJ43 1 
 PZ33 (top of pit) 1 
 RZ33 1 
Alcoves  2 
Regular tunnel  from UJ43 to RZ33 11 
 Total 20 
 4
 
Table 4. Sector 4–5 
Location  Number 
Enlargements/junctions UJ46 1 
 UJ47 1 
 RR53 1 
 UJ53 1 
 RZ54 1 
Alcoves  2 
Regular tunnel  from UJ47 to RR53 9 
 Total 16 
 
 
Table 5. Sector 6–5 
Location  Number 
Enlargements/junctions PM65 1 
 PZ65 1 
 UX65 1 
 UJ64 1 
 UJ63 1 
 UJ62 1 
 UD62 1 
 RR57 1 
 UJ57 1 
 UJ56 1 
 PM56 (top of pit) 1 
Alcoves  2 
Regular tunnel  from UJ62 to RR57 9 
 Total 22 
 
 
Table 6. Sector 6–7 
Location  Number 
Enlargements/junctions UJ66 1 
 UJ67 1 
 UJ68 1 
 UD68 1 
 RR73 1 
Alcoves  2 
Regular tunnel  from UJ68 to RR73 9 
 Total 16 
 5
Table 7. Sector 8-7 
Location  Number 
Enlargements/junctions PM85 (top of pit) 1 
 PZ85 (top of pit) 1 
 UX85 1 
 UJ84 1 
 UJ83 1 
 RR77 1 
 UJ76 1 
 PM76 (top of pit) 1 
Alcoves  2 
Regular tunnel  from UJ83 to RR77 9 
 Total 19 
 
 
Table 8. Sector 8–1 
Location  Number 
Enlargements/junctions UJ86 1 
 UJ87 1 
 UJ12 1 
 RR13 1 
 UJ14 1 
 PM15 (top of pit) 1 
 TJ8 1 
 TT40  1 
Alcoves  2 
Regular tunnel  from UJ87 to UJ12 8 
 Total 18 
 
